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The sight and sound of a person speaking or a ball bouncing may seem simultaneous, but
their corresponding neural signals are spread out over time as they arrive at different
multisensory brain sites. How subjective timing relates to such neural timing remains a
fundamental neuroscientific and philosophical puzzle. A dominant assumption is that
temporal coherence is achieved by sensory resynchronisation or recalibration across
asynchronous brain events. This assumption is easily confirmed by estimating subjective
audiovisual timing for groups of subjects, which is on average similar across different
measures and stimuli, and approximately veridical. But few studies have examined normal
and pathological individual differences in such measures.
Case PH, with lesions in pons and basal ganglia, hears people speak before seeing their
lips move. Temporal order judgements (TOJs) confirmed this: voices had to lag lip-
movements (by w200 msec) to seem synchronous to PH. Curiously, voices had to lead lips
(also by w200 msec) to maximise the McGurk illusion (a measure of audiovisual speech
integration). On average across these measures, PH’s timing was therefore still veridical.
Age-matched control participants showed similar discrepancies. Indeed, normal individual
differences in TOJ andMcGurk timing correlated negatively: subjects needing an auditory lag
for subjective simultaneity needed an auditory lead for maximal McGurk, and vice versa.
This generalised to theStreameBounce illusion. Such surprising antagonismseemsopposed
to good sensory resynchronisation, yet average timing across tasks was still near-veridical.
Our findings reveal remarkable disunity of audiovisual timing within and between
subjects. To explain this we propose that the timing of audiovisual signals within different
brain mechanisms is perceived relative to the average timing across mechanisms. Such
renormalisation fully explains the curious antagonistic relationship between disparate
timing estimates in PH and healthy participants, and how they can still perceive the timing
of external events correctly, on average.
ª 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.thampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, United Kingdom.
(E.D. Freeman).
Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.
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When a person speaks, we usually expect to hear their voice at
the same time as seeing their lips move. Furthermore, if we
watch their lips, it often helps us to hear their voice better, via
‘speechreading’ (Sumby and Pollack, 1954). Two distinct kinds
of processes are implied by such observations: synchronisa-
tion and integration. Firstly, we are sensitive to when auditory
and visual events are occurring at the same time (Alais and
Carlile, 2005; King, 2005; Kopinska and Harris, 2004; Sugita
and Suzuki, 2003). Secondly, the ability to benefit from the
combination of modalities, as in speechreading, requires that
auditory and visual information be brought together in the
brain and integrated. So automatic and compelling is such
integration that artificial mismatches between sound and
vision can easily induce illusory changes in the perceived
location, timing or actual interpretation of the stimuli
(Bertelson and Radeau, 1981; Howard and Templeton, 1966;
McGurk and MacDonald, 1976; Witkin et al., 1952).
It is easy to take for granted that audiovisual events are
always synchronised and integrated correctly. But here, we
present the first ever confirmed case of a patient (PH) who
hears peoples’ voices before he sees their lips move. Testing
this individual in comparison with neurologically healthy
participants gave us the unique opportunity to address two
issues: Firstly, we ask whether PH’s auditory leading phe-
nomenon is selective for subjective synchrony or whether his
audiovisual integration is also affected. This addresses a
current debate over whether optimal integration depends on
achieving subjective synchrony, or whether integration obeys
independent temporal constraints (Arnold et al., 2005; Martin
et al., 2013; Munhall et al., 1996; Soto-Faraco and Alsius, 2007,
2009; van Wassenhove et al., 2007). Secondly, PH’s patholog-
ical desynchronisation might provide insight into the deeper
question of how (or indeed whether) sensory synchronisation
is normally achieved, which has long perplexed neuroscien-
tists and philosophers (Dennett and Kinsbourne, 1995; Harris
et al., 2008; Keetels and Vroomen, 2012; Spence and Squire,
2003; Vroomen and Keetels, 2010; Zeki and Bartels, 1998). We
consider this issue first.1.1. Multisensory synchronisation
The problem of synchronisation is exemplified by the maxim
known as Segal’s law: ‘With one clock you always know the time;
with two you are never sure’. Does the brain also have multiple
clocks, and if so, does this create a similar uncertainty? There
are manymultimodal convergence zones in the brain (Bushara
et al., 2001; Cappe et al., 2009; Driver and Noesselt, 2008;
Ghazanfar and Schroeder, 2006; Macaluso and Driver, 2005;
Meredith et al., 1987; Stevenson et al., 2010), and to get there,
auditory and visual signals must traverse different routes and
distances, thus most likely arriving at different times (Arnold
et al., 2001; Aschersleben and Prinz, 1995; Halliday and
Mingay, 1964; Moutoussis and Zeki, 1997; Stone et al., 2001).
Consequently each area will have different information about
when visual and auditory events occurred (Scharnowski et al.,
2013). This entails a ‘multiple-clocks’ uncertainty for knowing
the absolute and relative timing of external events.Despite such systemic and intrinsic asynchrony, subjects
still often recognise when auditory and visual sources are
approximately synchronous (Harris et al., 2008), at least for
proximal if not always for distal stimuli (Alais and Carlile,
2005; Arnold et al., 2005; Heron et al., 2007; King, 2005;
Kopinska and Harris, 2004; Stone et al., 2001; Sugita and
Suzuki, 2003; Vroomen and Keetels, 2010). Shifts in subjec-
tive simultaneity following adaptation to asynchrony are
consistent with the existence of mechanisms functioning at
least locally to resynchronise temporal discrepancies between
modalities (Fujisaki et al., 2004; Hanson et al., 2008; Miyazaki
et al., 2006; Yamamoto et al., 2012). However, individuals
differ widely with respect to the objective audiovisual asyn-
chrony which they perceive as subjectively synchronous (the
Point of Subjective Simultaneitye PSS; Stone et al., 2001). This
may depend intrinsically on the time for neural conduction
and processing of signals, which may differ between stimuli
and individuals (Arnold et al., 2001; Aschersleben and Prinz,
1995; Halliday and Mingay, 1964; Moutoussis and Zeki, 1997;
Stone et al., 2001), though attentional biases may also account
for some apparent individual differences in multisensory
timing (Spence and Parise, 2010; Spence et al., 2001).
Furthermore, even within the same subjects given the same
stimuli, different tasks produce uncorrelated estimates of PSS
(van Eijk et al., 2008) though such variations may depend on
strategic variables (Garcı´a-Pe´rez and Alcala´-Quintana, 2012;
Schneider and Bavelier, 2003; van Eijk et al., 2008). Thus syn-
chronising mechanisms, if they exist (Zeki and Bartels, 1998),
may not function perfectly.
If there were a single specialised mechanism for
multisensory synchronisation, one might expect to find in-
dividuals for whom different modalities have been chroni-
cally desynchronised following a brain trauma. Loss of acuity
for temporal order has been observed following temporal lo-
bectomy (Sherwin and Efron, 1980), but the lack of selective
impairments in temporal processing is inconsistent with the
notion of a unitary specialisedmechanism underlying timing
perception (Wiener et al., 2011). Indeed, there is only one
previously reported case of apparently acquired sensory
desynchronisation (Hamilton et al., 2006). Hamilton et al.
(2006) described patient AWF who claimed to experience ‘a
perceived temporal mismatch’ (Abstract). However they did not
specify whether vision actually preceded or lagged audition,
and did not formally quantify the temporal mismatch using
objective measures, for example by measuring performance
across a range of audiovisual asynchronies. Thus to date,
evidence that sensory synchronisation can be pathologically
impaired rests largely on AWF’s subjective report, which is
not very specific.
1.2. Dependence of integration on synchronisation
While investigations of synchronisation have typically
focused on temporal relationships between modalities (e.g.,
Harris et al., 2008), the multiple-clocks problem also logically
applies more generally between different processes. Here we
consider two such notional processes, supporting subjective
temporal judgements versus those that serve to integrate in-
puts from different modalities. We ask whether sound and
vision are optimally integrated when they are subjectively
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evidence from functional brain imaging suggests they are
supported by distinct brain mechanisms (Bertini et al., 2010;
Miller and D’Esposito, 2005; Stevenson et al., 2010). Given such
separation, and the ‘multiple-clocks’ problem which that en-
tails, any evidence of dependence of integration on synchro-
nisation could be indicative of synchronising mechanisms
operating between distinct cognitive processes, not just be-
tween modalities as a whole.
It seems intuitive that such unity of timing across processes
should be achieved. Such an intuition might be based on the
assumption that single physical events should be associated
withaunitarypercept (WelchandWarren,1980). Itmight indeed
besurprising ifweconsciouslyperceiveddifferentaspectsof the
same event as occurring at different times (though in some
cases it seems we do; Arnold et al., 2001; Moutoussis and Zeki,
1997). Evidence suggests that the brain does actively strive to
maintain synchrony across processes. For example in the ‘unity
effect’, stimuliwhichare readily integrated (such asmeaningful
speech sounds and lip-movements) tend to be judged as syn-
chronous even if they are actually not (Vatakis and Spence,
2007). Conversely, integration may depend on a prior decision
about the temporal correspondence of auditory and visual
streams. For example, in the classic McGurk illusion (McGurk
and MacDonald, 1976), the combination of a voice saying /ba/
anda facemouthing [ga]oftenresults inhearing thesyllable /da/
,whileauditory /da/withvisual [ba]cansound like /ba/, but such
visual interference declines (on average) with increasing asyn-
chrony between voice and lips (Munhall et al., 1996; Soto-Faraco
and Alsius, 2007, 2009; van Wassenhove et al., 2007). Similarly
for non-speech stimuli, we are more likely (on average) to
perceive two balls as bouncing off each other when their colli-
sion is accompanied simultaneously by a sound, compared to
when these auditory and visual events are asynchronous
(Sekuler et al., 1997). Though such findings demonstrate
dependence of integration on synchrony, on average across
participants, its critical dependence on individuals’ own sub-
jective synchrony has not been examined to date.
The above positive evidence suggests that the brain actively
benefits from, and actively strives for subjective unity across its
different process. But however desirable, a unitary perceptmay
not always be achieved. Someobservations appear to challenge
the intuitive dependence of multisensory integration on au-
diovisual synchronisation (Spence and Ngo, 2012). For example
in theMcGurk effect, Soto-Faraco and Alsius (2007, 2009) used a
dual-task paradigm to measure McGurk interference and sub-
jective synchrony as a function of audiovisual asynchrony.
They found that illusory McGurk percepts were often reported
even for audiovisual stimuli that could be reliably identified as
asynchronous (on average across participants). Such ‘dual
perception’ of good lip-voice integration despite a detectable
audiovisual asynchrony hints that unity can be violated, and
thus in principle measures of subjective integration and syn-
chronisation might be based on their own stimulus inputs and
correspondence mechanisms rather than shared or synchron-
ised mechanisms. Some doubt remains about this however,
because integration and synchronisation judgements still cen-
tred on similar near-veridical asynchronies (on average), and
thus could still be subject to common synchronising mecha-
nisms. Furthermore, any apparent differences between themeasures might just reflect different criteria for deciding
whether two asynchronous events from different modalities
should be integrated or segmented, compared towhendeciding
whether the two events are synchronous or asynchronous. The
mismatch betweenmeasures was also small, though note that
these measures were averaged across observers, which might
conceal the true extent to which optimal timing may differ
between mechanisms within individuals.
Neuropsychological studiesmight contribute to this debate
if cases could be found where brain lesions result in selective
impairment of either synchronisation or integration, or joint
impairment of both together. A case of the latter kind seems to
be reported by Hamilton et al. (2006), where the ‘temporal
mismatch’ experienced by patient AWF coincided with an
eliminated McGurk effect for veridically synchronous stimuli.
However Hamilton et al. did not test McGurk under different
conditions of audiovisual asynchrony. Thus the critical evi-
dence for true interdependence of synchronisation and inte-
gration functions was lacking, which would have been
provided if the McGurk effect had been reinstated in AWF, for
subjectively simultaneous stimuli.
1.3. The present study
From the above review itmay be concluded that the question of
how, or indeed whether, the brain can minimise discrepancies
in timing betweenmodalities and between cognitive processes,
has not yet been satisfactorily resolved. Critical insightsmay be
gained by studying individual differences between measures
probing synchronisation and integration, and comparing nat-
ural variations in thesemeasureswith those acquired following
brain injury.
In particular, we can examine (1) whether PH is an example
of a categorical breakdown of putative unifying mechanisms,
or whether his lesions have merely shifted him along a con-
tinuum of disunity, where we may also find ourselves. We
therefore ask, how unusual is PH (Experiment 1)? If highly
abnormal, he could be ‘the exception that proves the rule’,
that unity and synchrony are normally achieved in individuals
(albeit with inaccuracies). But exceptions can also ‘prove’ rules
wrong. Our evidence, of large discrepancies between our two
measures in PH and surprisingly also in normal subjects,
suggests that asynchrony and disunity may rule instead.
We can also ask (2) whether PH’s acquired subjective
asynchrony is specific to perception of audiovisual temporal
order or whether this affects the temporal tuning of audiovi-
sual integration, and also how closelymeasures of integration
correspond with measures of synchrony, within normal in-
dividuals. We assess integration in the McGurk effect (Exper-
iment 2) and the StreameBounce illusion (Experiment 3). If
multimodal integration and synchronisation of speech stimuli
are based on dependent mechanisms, it seems straightfor-
ward to predict that individual differences for our two mea-
sures will correlate positively. Alternatively, a null correlation
seems intuitively likely if these mechanisms were fully inde-
pendent. We find neither. Our counterintuitive results call for
a revised understanding of how the brain solves the multiple-
clocks problem, which we propose.
Our study simply replicated the dual-task paradigm of
Soto-Faraco andAlsius (2007) with PH andnormal controls. On
Table 1 e Neuropsychological test results for PH.
Test PH
Wechsler abbreviated scale of intelligence (The
Psychological Corporation, 1999)
Full scale IQ 136
Verbal IQ 133
Performance IQ 129
Test of everyday attention
Elevator counting 6/7
Elevator counting with distraction 10/10
Visual Object and Space Perception Battery (Warrington
and James, 1991)
Shape detection 20/20
Incomplete Letters 20/20
Silhouettes 19/30
Object decision 19/20
Dot counting 10/10
Position discrimination 20/20
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visual asynchronies. There then followed two tasks, temporal
order judgement (TOJ) and phoneme discrimination, to obtain
two concurrent measures of the audiovisual asynchrony that
(1) is perceived as synchronous, and (2) induces maximal
integration, as measured by the strength of the McGurk illu-
sion. We then analysed individual differences on these mea-
sures rather than just average performance.
As PH’s phenomenology is of a distinct temporal order, of
lips lagging voices, TOJ was chosen to probe his subjective
report as directly as possible.Wewere also concerned that the
alternative paradigm, Simultaneity Judgement, might be per-
formed heuristically on the basis of the quality of speech
integration, and thus our measure of subjective timing in PH
and control subjects might have been confounded by changes
in integration as a function of asynchrony.
Before reporting the methods and results of our experi-
ments we first provide detailed documentation of case PH.
Number location 9/10
Cube analysis 10/10
Sentence repetition (auditory only) 22/22
Low þ high frequency word repetition 100%
Praxis Normal2. PH case study
PH, a retired pilot aged 67, first experienced auditory leading
whilewatching television. He initially suspected poor dubbing,
but then later noticed the same phenomenon in conversations
with people. After seeking medical advice at his workplace, he
was referred to Professor Peter Brown at his Queen Square
neurology clinic, where we recruited him for this research. He
also reports perceiving the sound of his own voice before the
proprioception of his corresponding mouth and jaw move-
ments. The onset seems to have been abrupt, not accompa-
nied by any other symptoms, and initially progressing slowly
but now stable according to his subjective reports, though
becoming temporarily more intense when fatigued. He also
reported experiencing difficulty in speech comprehension in
noisy environments, though attributes this to tinnitus. In
November 2007he had surgery to treat pericarditis, and in 2008
he had developed generalised myasthenia gravis [anti-acetyl-
choline (ACh) receptor antibody and electromyography (EMG)
positive]. His current complaint came on 2e3months after the
onset of the myasthenia, however it is unknown to what
extent these phenomena are related (Keesey, 1999).
A routine neurological examination revealed no abnor-
malities. There was no evidence of fatiguability. Mild hearing
loss for high frequencies was observed using audiometry.
Performance in a standard battery of neuropsychological tests
(Table 1) revealed generally high functioning with no specific
functional impairments. He showed above average Wechsler
intelligence quotient (IQ) (The Psychological Corporation, 1999)
and near-perfect performance on tests of everyday attention
(Robertson, 2006), and the Visual Object and Space Perception
Battery (Warrington and James, 1991), with the sole exception
of silhouette identification (19/30). Sentence repetition (Spreen
and Benton, 1969), performed while the speaker’s face was
hidden from view, was perfect and immediate.
2.1. Imaging
High resolution magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) (500 mm3)
revealed two lesions. Lesion 1 was located in superiormesencephalon, at the left anterio-medial tip of the sub-
thalamic nucleus (11.5 mm left and 16.8 mm posterior to the
anterior commisure). Total lesion volume was 42 mm3. Lesion
2 was located in mid-brainstem within the right dorso-medial
pontine nucleus at the level of middle cerebellar peduncle
around the exit of the trigeminal nerve (see Fig. 1). These were
considered likely to represent small established lacunar in-
farcts. There was no evidence of an acute ischaemic lesion or
microhaemorrhages.
Diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) was undertaken using im-
ages fromhealthy subjects, to identify brain regionswhich are
connected to the lesion sites (see Supplementary Methods S1
and Supplementary Figure 1). Results indicated that lesion 1
had ipsilateral projections predominately into the motor
cortico-striato-pallido-thalamic-cortical relay loop, and a
small projection with the Orbito-Frontal relay loop. Cortical
projections were consistent with Limbic subthalamic nucleus
(STN) (Lambert et al., 2012). Lesion 2 lay along the olivo-
collicular pathway (Supplementary Figure 1), with largely
ipsilateral projections to inferior colliculus and extending
down to themedial territory of the peri-olivary nucleus. There
was also a possible involvement of the tectopontine pathway.
This second lesion may be associated with the early auditory
system. Both regions have been implicated in crossmodal in-
teractions (Halverson and Freeman, 2010; Kolomiets et al.,
2001), and in event timing (Teki et al., 2011).3. Methods
3.1. Healthy participants
Experiment 1 had 10 participants similar in age to PH (59e74
years, mean 65, standard deviation e SD 5). Experiment 2 had
27 neurologically healthy young subjects (18e28 years,
Fig. 1 e T2 weighted images of both lesion sites, outlined in red.
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matched controls. Data from four further participants were
excluded, due to poor performance, resulting in implausible
estimates of subjective timing>300msec asynchrony, outside
the typical range for multisensory integration (Vatakis et al.,
2008; Vatakis and Spence, 2007) and indicative of poor qual-
ity data and unreliable function fits. Experiment 3 (testing the
StreameBounce illusion) had 24 participants aged 18e24,
excluding two others who reported no ‘bounce’ illusion. All
participants were naı¨ve to the specific aims of this study.
Participants received a monetary reward. Procedures were
approved by the local Psychology ethics committee.3.2. Apparatus and stimuli
Laboratory apparatus comprised an Apple Mac Mini, with
Labtec speakers positioned either side of a 17" Sony HMD-
A420 cathode ray tube (CRT) display, viewed in darkness
from 70 cm. Mobile apparatus for older participants and PH
comprised a Sony Vaio SZ1XP PC with built-in speakers and
13.3" liquid crystal display (LCD) display, viewed from
approximately 57 cm. In both cases video mode was
1200 800 with a 60 Hz refresh rate. Subjects responded using
the cursor keys on the standard keyboard.
McGurk stimuliwere basedonSoto-FaracoandAlsius (2007),
which were kindly provided by the authors (see Fig. 2 for di-
mensions, and Supplementary Video). Auditory /ba/ and /da/
phonemes (with white noise at 15% of maximum amplitude)
were combined with visual lip-movements for [ba], [da] and
[ga]. The two incongruent pairings for eliciting the McGurkeffect were /ba/ þ [ga] ¼ ‘da’ and /da/ þ [ba] ¼ ‘ba’ or ‘bda’. The
other two ‘congruent’ pairings /ba/þ [ba] and /da/þ [da] tend to
be heard correctly. Backgroundwas set to the average red green
blue (RGB) value across all pixels and frames. For the Streame
Bounce experiment, visual stimuli were two yellow circular at
maximum contrast on a black background. Each moved from
positions left and right above fixation, via the central fixation
point, to opposite positions below fixation (see Fig. 2 for di-
mensions, and Supplementary Video). Animations were
accompanied by a 400 Hz tone of 100 msec duration, with the
same manipulation of asynchrony as for the McGurk stimuli.
Movies were followed by 9 pt white text prompting responses,
displayed centrally.
Supplementary data related to this article can be found
online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2013.03.006.
We also tested PH with various biological and/or non-
speech stimuli. Finger-click movies, of 3000 msec duration,
showed a hand with the middle finger clicking against the
thumb. Sequences began with either the hand open (to
provide predictive information) or closed. For scrambled-
speech stimuli, the soundtrack from the original McGurk
stimuli was passed through a three-channel noise vocoder
using Praat software (version 5.1.21, http://www.praat.org),
rendering the speech unintelligible but without affecting the
spectral composition of the sound or the temporal sequence
of amplitude modulations. The video sequence remained the
same. Non-biological stimuli comprised a white square
(1.67  on each side) on a black background, presented for
200 msec and paired with a white-noise burst of 200 msec
duration.
Fig. 2 e Trial sequence and stimuli for McGurk (top row) and StreameBounce illusions (bottom).
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Except where specified we used a dual-task paradigm (Soto-
Faraco and Alsius, 2007) (Fig. 2) to obtain two concurrent
measures of the audiovisual asynchrony that is (1) perceived
as synchronous, and (2) optimal for maximum audiovisual
integration, as measured by the McGurk effect. All experi-
ments employed a repeated-measures factorial design. For
the audiovisual asynchrony manipulation, the soundtrack
could be shifted forwards or backwards in time relative to the
visual sequence over a range of500msec through nine equal
steps of 125 msec including zero (sound synchronous with
video). In Experiments 1 and 2, an independent variable was
the congruency of lip-movements with voice (see Stimuli
above). There were two possible lip-voice combinations for
each congruent/incongruent pairing. Only incongruous con-
ditions were used for assessing McGurk interference. Two
dependent measures were obtained from two responses eli-
cited after each trial, for TOJs and phoneme identity/streame
bounce judgements respectively.
3.4. Procedure
Each trial began with a fixation display. Following a keypress
and a blank interval (duration randomly selected from the
range 1000  500 msec), a movie was displayed for 2800 msec.
On each trial the audiovisual asynchrony and stimulus pairing
were selected pseudo-randomly. Each stimulus pairing was
presented at each of the nine possible asynchronies 8e10
times in pseudorandom order. Following movie offset, there
were two successive forced-choice questions. Firstly, a TOJ
task asked whether the voice (or beep) onset preceded orfollowed the lip-movement (or visual collision). In Experiments
1 and 2, the second question elicited a phoneme discrimina-
tion, asking whether the voice said “ba” or “da” [a third option
for ‘other’, used on only .3%  .3% standard error of the mean
(SEM) of trials, was not included in further analysis]. Subjects
were encouraged to choose the option that sounded the closest
to what they heard. In Experiment 3, this second question
asked subjects to indicate whether they saw the balls bounce
or stream through each other. The additional tests performed
by PH, with finger-clicks, flashes and noise-bursts, and
scrambled speech, were all run as a single-task eliciting TOJs.
3.5. Analysis
For TOJ, we plotted the proportion of ‘voice second’ responses
(where the auditory onset was judged to lag the visual onset)
as a psychometric function of actual auditory lag time in
milliseconds (note that negative lag denotes an auditory lead).
The proportion of ‘sound second’ values was typically below
50% for negative auditory lags (i.e., sound leads vision), and
above 50% for positive auditory lags. A logistic function was
then fitted to the psychometric data, using a maximum-
likelihood algorithm provided by the PSIGNIFIT toolbox for
Matlab (Wichmann and Hill, 2001). We could then read off
from the fitted function the critical auditory lag corresponding
to the participant’s PSS. This is the point at which the
participant is at chance (50%) deciding whether the sound
came first or second relative to the visual onset. The same
software was used to find the slope of the function and to
derive 95% confidence intervals for both PSS and slope esti-
mates, via a bootstrapping procedure. Finally, we estimated
the additional auditory lag required for the participant to go
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of the time. The resulting value quantifies the lag that can
produce a Just Noticeable Difference (JND) between subjec-
tively synchronous and asynchronous stimuli.
For the phoneme discrimination task we obtained the
proportion of trials in which the reported phoneme was
consistent with the lip-movements, averaged across incon-
gruous conditions only. For example, a ‘ba’ response to /da/
þ [ba] and a ‘da’ response to /ba/ þ [ga] were scored as
‘consistent’. This was plotted as a psychometric function of
auditory lag. The data from each of the two incongruent
conditions, plus the average across them, were fit using an
asymmetric double sigmoid function (ADS, following van
Wassenhove et al., 2007), which results in a bell-shaped curve
with adjustable height, width and asymmetry, using the
following equation:
y ¼1
2

tanh

x c1
w1

 tanh

x c2
w2

with constraintsw1 > 0 andw2 > 0
The optimal auditory lag for maximum McGurk interfer-
ence (tMcG) from vision was read off at the peak of each of
these interpolated functions and averaged, with 95% confi-
dence intervals derived from fits of 1000 bootstrapped sam-
ples. For streamebounce judgements, ADS functions were
fitted to the proportion of ‘bounce’ responses.
Across subjects, mean (and SD) of R2 values for goodness of
fit of functions to the psychometric data were .89 (.13) for the
TOJ task, and .75 (.18) for the phoneme discrimination task.4. Results
All inferential statistics reported in the following are based on
parametric statistics, as data did not deviate significantly from
normality (KolmogoroveSmirnov p > .05).
4.1. Experiment 1
4.1.1. PH
PH’s TOJs corroborated his subjective report of voice leading
lips. His PSS was shifted away from veridical to 210 msec
auditory lag. Thismeans that subjective synchrony could only
be restored for PH by artificially lagging voices relative to lip-
movements (by 210 msec, see Table 2), at which point tem-
poral order became indistinguishable (Fig. 3a). Also veryTable 2 e Mean results from McGurk experiment.
N PSSa CIb JNDc CI tMcGd CI
PH 1 210 40 93 35 240 56
Older 10 19 94 176 64 21 78
Younger 27 31 57 272 81 62 42
a PSS, in milliseconds; positive values for auditory lag, negative for
auditory lead.
b CI: 95% confidence interval (msec); estimated for PH by boot-
strapping and for controls from SEMean.
c JND from subjective simultaneity (msec).
d tMcG: asynchrony for maximum McGurk effect (msec). Positive
values for auditory lag.curiously, the optimal asynchrony for maximum McGurk
(tMcG) showed almost exactly the opposite asynchrony
(240 msec auditory lead was required for optimum McGurk).
Thus voices effectively lagged lip-movements for the pur-
poses of audiovisual speech integration (Fig. 3b).
To investigate the generality of PH’s auditory lead we
tested him on a variety of biological and artificial non-speech
stimuli, using single-task TOJs. In separate single-task tests,
we found PSS was closer to veridical for artificial stimuli
(flash/noise-burst pairs: 2  99 msec auditory lag, 95% confi-
dence interval), finger-clicks (with no significant difference
between movies beginning from open or closed-hand posi-
tions: 64  85 msec), and for unintelligible noise-vocoded
speech (52  98 msec). In contrast, a similar single-task
paradigm with the original speech stimuli showed a similar
PSS shift as in the dual-task situation (210  90 msec). It may
therefore be concluded that PH’s PSS shift was specific to
speech, and not dependent on the number of concurrent
tasks.
4.1.2. Comparison with controls
How unusual is PH? Using a modified t test for comparing an
individual’s test scorewitha smallnormative sample (Crawford
andHowell, 1998),we found PH’s tMcGwas significantly greater
than for 10 healthy age-matched participants [Crawford
t(9)¼ 2.23, p¼ .05]. The discrepancy between PH’s PSS and tMcG
measures was also significantly greater than for the control
sample [Crawford t(9) ¼ 2.46, p ¼ .04]. On these measures PH
therefore does seem abnormal. However his PSS was not
significantly deviant fromcontrols [t(9)¼ 1.50, p¼ .17 ] (Table 2).
Fig. 3 illustrates these results graphically as psychometric
functions for PH compared with the group average function.
We repeated the analysis after collecting data froma further
sample of 27 young participants (see Expt. 2) with similar re-
sults (Table 2). Relative to the tMcG measure, PH was again
significantly deviant from young participants [t(25) ¼ 2.64,
p¼ .01], and from thewhole combined-age sample [t(35)¼ 2.55,
p¼ .02]. The discrepancy between PSS and tMcGmeasures was
also significant for the young [t(25) ¼ 2.14, p ¼ .04] and
combined-age sample [t(35) ¼ 2.25, p ¼ .03]. However, he was
not deviant relative to the PSS for young [t(25) ¼ 1.28, p ¼ .21]
and the combined-age sample [t(35) ¼ 1.37, p ¼ .18].
It is surprising to note that on the measure that reflects
PH’s subjective report of voice leading lips, some healthy
participants showed PSS values of comparable magnitude to
PH (Fig. 4a). Given that some normal participants seemed to
show a similar magnitude of PSS shift, is PH is the only one
aware of asynchrony? 10/37 participants consistently reported
a visual or auditory lead on more than 75% of synchronous
trials. Thus for these participants, the difference between
veridically synchronous stimuli and their personal PSS was
actually greater than their JND for perceiving asynchrony. In
other words, these subjects seemed to reliably perceive
physically synchronous stimuli as asynchronous, at least
under laboratory conditions.
4.2. Experiment 2: McGurk with normative sample
PH’s two lesions in pons and STN seem well placed to disrupt
audition and/or timing (Halverson and Freeman, 2010;
Fig. 3 e Psychometric data for PH (with black data points and interpolation using a broken line), and for healthy young (black
continuous function) and older (grey) groups. a) TOJ: proportion of ‘voice second’ reports (y-axis) for different auditory lags
(negative x-values for auditory lead), interpolated with a logistic function. Horizontals indicate the PSS with 95% confidence
intervals based on bootstrapped estimates for PH and on SEMean for controls. b) Phoneme discrimination task: proportion
of responses following lip-movement, averaged across incongruous conditions only, interpolated using ADS functions.
Auditory lag for tMcG was read off at the maximum.
c o r t e x 4 9 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 2 8 7 5e2 8 8 72882Kolomiets et al., 2001; Teki et al., 2011), and might explain the
auditory lagging observed in tMcG. But how could the same
lesions also produce an opposite shift in PSS, and PH’s corre-
sponding experience of auditory leading?
Itmay be instructive to note that in PH our twomeasures of
sensory timing are distributed roughly symmetrically around
zero auditory lag. Thus despite the temporal disparity be-
tweenmechanisms it seems that on average across measures
he can still achieve near-veridical timing (see General
discussion for further elaboration). It is suggested that in
order tomaintain veridical performance, and thus continue to
live in the ‘present moment’, pathological auditory slowing
within impaired mechanisms is balanced by perceiving
auditory timing in preserved mechanisms as slightly earlier
than veridical. In other words the asynchronies obtainedFig. 4 e PSS (x-axis) plotted against asynchrony for maximum a)
and b) bounce illusions (tBounce) with line of best fit, and margwithin each mechanism might have been renormalised rela-
tive to the average asynchrony across mechanisms.
Such renormalisation might explain how veridical
perception is maintained on average following pathological
disruption of timing in selected mechanisms, but for neuro-
logically healthy people the prediction is highly counterintu-
itive: individual differences (Stone et al., 2001) which bias one
measure of subjective timing in one direction (e.g., auditory
lead for PSS) might be associated with the opposite bias in
other measures (e.g., auditory lag for tMcG, or vice versa). This
prediction of a negative correlation contrasts with the positive
correlation predicted if synchronising mechanisms brought
individual differences in PSS (Stone et al., 2001) and tMcG into
agreement (Fujisaki et al., 2004; Harris et al., 2008; Spence and
Squire, 2003; Vroomen and Keetels, 2010).McGurk, i.e., tMcG (open circle: PH; grey: older; black: young)
inal histograms.
c o r t e x 4 9 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 2 8 7 5e2 8 8 7 2883To test this we measured the correlation between PSS and
tMcG, across the whole sample of young and older partici-
pants (total N ¼ 37). As predicted by the compensation hy-
pothesis above, the correlation was significantly negative
(N ¼ 38, Pearson’s r ¼ .47, p ¼ .003, Fig. 4a). Yet on average
performance on both measures remained near-veridical
(Fig. 3).
4.3. Experiment 3: StreameBounce
Is this apparent repulsion of timing measures just a speech-
specific phenomenon? We tested this with the Streame
Bounce illusion (Sekuler et al., 1997, Fig. 1), in which two
approaching ‘balls’ may appear to bounce off each other when
their collision coincides with a sound, rather than streaming
past each other. As before, there were two questions after
each trial. The first probed the temporal order of the sound
relative to the visual collision. The second required partici-
pants to judge whether they saw the balls bouncing off each
other or streaming through each other, from which we esti-
mated the asynchrony for maximum ‘bounce’ (tBounce). We
again found a negative correlation between PSS and tBounce
(Pearson’s r ¼ .54, p ¼ .001, for 24 new young participants,
Fig. 4b). Note that in contrast to theMcGurk illusion for speech
where vision influences hearing, in this non-speech illusion,
hearing influences vision. Thus we may infer that this nega-
tive correlation pattern, replicated for speech and non-speech,
and in both directions of audiovisual influence, reflects a
general (rather than a stimulus-specific or task-specific)
characteristic of perception.5. General discussion
Our psychophysical investigation of PH confirmed his sub-
jective report of lips lagging voices, when measured using
TOJ, but revealed the opposite bias for McGurk integration,
with temporal tuning favouring auditory lagging. Thus PH
suffers not only from an acquired disruption of synchronisa-
tion, but also a violation of perceptual unity of timing across
different aspects of the same pairing of auditory and visual
stimuli. Neurologically normal individuals also showed a
comparable opponency between our two measures (in speech
and non-speech and in both directions of audiovisual influ-
ence): thus if one subject showed auditory lagging for TOJ, the
McGurk measure tended to show auditory leading (or vice
versa). Altogether, these counterintuitive findings suggest
that perception of synchrony and integration depend on
distinct rather than common synchronisingmechanisms, and
reveal one strategy by which the brain might achieve near-
veridical perception of the timing of multisensory events, at
least on average, despite the evident temporal disunity of
sensory processing.
5.1. How unusual is PH?
If specialised mechanisms existed to synchronise senses in
normal brains, onewould expect to findmore cases of acquired
sensory desynchronisation when such mechanisms are
lesioned (Wiener et al., 2011). There has only been one previousreport, of patient AWF (Hamilton et al., 2006). However the
similarity with PH is difficult to assess, as the direction of
AWF’s acquired ‘temporal mismatch’ was not specified, and he
was only tested with synchronous stimuli. AWF showed no
McGurk effect while PH did when tested with asynchronous
(auditory leading) stimuli. AWF’s lesions are also in a quite
different location, in right parietal cortex,while PH’s lesions are
in mid-brain and brainstem. We can at least claim that the
present case is the first to be reported of an acquired subjective
auditory lead, which is speech-specific and accompanied by an
auditory lag for optimal McGurk integration.
Surprisingly, some healthy participants also showed large
deviations of PSS; indeed for some, synchronous stimuli were
just-noticeably asynchronous. Thus it seems PH is not so
unusual in terms of experiencing a mismatch in audiovisual
timing. Such ubiquitous sensory asynchrony further un-
dermines support for the existence of specialised synchroni-
sationmechanisms. It also raises the obvious question of why
only PH is aware of his asynchrony in his everyday life. It is
possible that our TOJ results from normal participants are
specific to our laboratory conditions. In the outside world we
learn to expect that when auditory and visual events originate
from the same source, they are also very likely to occur
simultaneously, regardless of their sensory timing. Under this
unity assumption (Vatakis and Spence, 2007; Welch and
Warren, 1980) our perception might tend to rely more on
this expectation than any sensory evidence of asynchrony.
Our paradigm, by contrast, presented a randomised range of
asynchronous stimuli with no feedback about which was
actually synchronous. In this situation the unity assumption
cannot be confidently applied, and perceptionsmay rely more
on asynchronous sensory inputs than prior expectations.
Under such conditions even neurologically healthy subjects
might notice an asynchrony given actually synchronous
stimuli. As for PH, his subjective asynchrony (which changed
unexpectedly later in life) might just be too great for him to
reconcile with the assumption of unity, even outside the lab
(Vatakis and Spence, 2007; Welch and Warren, 1980).
While PH’s auditory lead for PSS is not statistically
abnormal, his auditory lag for optimal McGurk (tMcG) is. This
might be explained if the principle impairment caused by his
lesions is actually a slowing of auditory processing, consistent
with the location of his lesion on a tract connecting with the
inferior colliculus, part of the early auditory system (see
Supplementary Materials for an analysis of tractography).
The dissociation between PH’s temporal tuning of subjec-
tive simultaneity for TOJ, versus for phoneme discrimination,
suggests that each different task may probe different mech-
anisms, each subject to their own neural asynchronies
(Aschersleben and Prinz, 1995). For example, one mechanism
might be involved in speech integration and the other in
judging sensory synchrony (Calvert, 2001; Miller and
D’Esposito, 2005; Vroomen and Stekelenburg, 2011). The
further dissociation between PSS for speech versus non-
speech would be consistent with the existence of special
mechanisms for these different stimulus types (Vatakis et al.,
2008). Alternatively the same mechanisms might have
different temporal tunings depending on the low-level char-
acteristics of the specific stimulus presented (Vroomen and
Stekelenburg, 2011). From these dissociations it seems, at
Fig. 5 e Temporal renormalisation theory: hypothetical
relationship between neural and subjective audiovisual
asynchrony. Top left: signals from synchronous auditory
and visual stimuli (represented by blue and red disks)
converge on different audiovisual mechanisms in the brain
via different routes (grey disks). For individual
mechanisms the actual stimulus timing cannot be
dissociated from the propagation latency. Top right:
schematic of the evoked distribution of neural
asynchronies, across mechanisms, plotting probability of
different asynchronies, as a function of neural asynchrony,
with increasing delays of auditory signals relative to visual
towards the right. The x-axis text refers to the subjective
experience of auditory lead, simultaneity, or auditory lag,
given these different neural asynchronies. The neural
asynchrony at the central tendency of the distribution is
the one which relates most reliably to the objective timing
of the auditory and visual stimuli, after delays within
individual mechanisms have been averaged out. Following
experience with this distribution in natural contexts where
objective synchrony is likely, tasks probing mechanisms
registering asynchronies near this average may evoke
perception of synchrony (marked with a dotted line and
‘Simult’); asynchronies registered within other
mechanisms are perceived in proportion to their distance
from the average. Lower left: an example where auditory
inputs to a subset of mechanisms (towards the right) are
particularly delayed. For patient PH it is assumed that
these mechanisms contribute to the temporal tuning of the
McGurk illusion (labelled McG; see main text), while
mechanisms involved in TOJ are preserved. Lower right:
the bimodal distribution resulting from delayed auditory
input for the McGurk task. The mean of the distribution
has shifted towards the auditory-lagged mechanisms
serving the McGurk task (labelled McG). The perceived
asynchrony within each mechanism is renormalised to
this new distribution mean. The result is that neural
asynchronies for unaffected mechanisms (here labelled
TOJ) originally perceived as synchronous (as in the top
example) are now perceived as auditory leading.
c o r t e x 4 9 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 2 8 7 5e2 8 8 72884least for PH, that there are indeed multiple clocks (see
Introduction), whose discrepant timings cannot be reconciled.
5.2. How closely do measures of integration normally
correspond with measures of synchrony?
An appealing intuition is that single physical events should be
associated with a unitary percept (Welch and Warren, 1980).
Evidence suggests that the brain strives for (Vatakis and
Spence, 2007), and benefits from (Soto-Faraco and Alsius,
2007, 2009; van Wassenhove et al., 2007) such unity. But PH
shows a dramatic failure of unity, with voices subjectively
leading lip-movements, at the same time as effectively lagging
lip-movements for the purposes of integration. Is PH just an
exception to the putative rule that unity is normally achieved?
Previous studies with normal participants (using the original
paradigm borrowed here) have also reported ‘dual perception’
of good lip-voice integration despite a detectable audiovisual
asynchrony (Soto-Faraco and Alsius, 2007). However such vi-
olations were small when measured on average across par-
ticipants, and could arguably have reflected different decision
criteria for the two concurrent judgements. The TOJ task may
be particularly susceptible to response biases (Garcı´a-Pe´rez
and Alcala´-Quintana, 2012; Soto-Faraco and Alsius, 2009;
van Eijk et al., 2008). However such criterion or response bias
effects, or attentional biases such as prior-entry (Spence and
Parise, 2010; Spence et al., 2001) cannot easily explain away
the negative correlation we show in Fig. 4 (see our
Supplementary Discussion). Our analysis of individual dif-
ferences reveals the true extent to which subjective unity is
routinely violated in normal participants, who can sometimes
perceive, concurrently, different aspects of a single pair of
auditory and visual events to be occurring at quite different
times relative to each other.
5.3. Theoretical accounts
Over the years there have been a variety of approaches to the
problem of how temporal unity can be maintained across
asynchronous processes in the brain (Keetels and Vroomen,
2012). One solution might be to have dedicated mechanisms
for timing events, via a supramodal mechanism (Hanson
et al., 2008; Treisman, 1963), or specialised timing mecha-
nisms residing in cerebellum or basal ganglia (Ivry and
Spencer, 2004), functioning to provide a common time code
for multisensory events. Timing discrepancies might also be
minimised (Keetels and Vroomen, 2012), via temporal
ventriloquism (Freeman and Driver, 2008; Morein-Zamir et al.,
2003; Vroomen and De Gelder, 2004), or by selectively delaying
onemodality (Sternberg and Knoll, 1973), or by recalibration of
temporal codes (Fujisaki et al., 2004), so that a frequently
occurring neural asynchrony is perceived as synchronous.
Compensatory adjustments might also be made in a context-
sensitive way, for example taking into account the distance of
events from the observer (Harris et al., 2008) or the prior
likelihood that the causal events are actually synchronous or
not (Miyazaki et al., 2006; Yamamoto et al., 2012).
The above accounts, on first sight, seem difficult to square
with the present evidence of disunity, and particularly the
negative correlation between differentmeasures of audiovisualtiming (Fig. 4). Our results suggest that timing discrepancies
between mechanisms serving performance of our synchroni-
sation and integration tasks cannot be fully reconciled. How-
ever, as we explain below (and in Fig. 5), our evidence is still
c o r t e x 4 9 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 2 8 7 5e2 8 8 7 2885consistent with the mainstream assumption that the brain
adjusts for differences in neural timing between distinct mo-
dalities. Our account just makes explicit the assumption that
this adjustment ismade based on average differences in timing:
either between modalities (Harris et al., 2008), or in principle
more generally between cognitive processes or any arbitrary
groupings of temporally discrepant mechanisms.
5.4. Temporal renormalisation
Given the present evidence that disparities in timing for
different tasks cannot be fully minimised, there appears to be
no escape from themultiple-clocks problem: ‘with one clock you
always know the time; with two you are never sure’. But of course,
Segal’s maxim is misleading. Given a room full of clocks, each
independently subject to inaccuracies, our best guess at the
correct time comes from the average across all clocks. Thus
statistically, the more clocks we have the better for accurately
estimating this average. Such averagingmay be how the brain
solves the multiple-clocks problem. This problem is that
different auditory and visual stimuli are processed at different
speeds, and arrive at different mechanisms (e.g., contributing
to synchrony and integration judgements respectively) at
different times, resulting in a distribution of neural timings
measured across the different mechanisms. From the point of
view of an individual mechanism contributing to this distri-
bution, it is uncertain to what extent the timing of its inputs
reflects the true external timing of events or just internal
processing delays (Scharnowski et al., 2013). But the average
over the distribution provides a purer estimate of the
neural timing that relates most reliably to the true timing of
external events (see Fig. 5 for a schematic illustration, and
Supplementary Discussion of how this could apply before
and/or after unimodal signals). We propose that discrepancies
in timing between mechanisms are not minimised but perceived
relative to their average timing.
In contrast to the other theoretical alternatives, this tem-
poral renormalisation theory provides a fuller and more
explicit account of all of our paradoxical findings: why a lesion
produces opposite lags in different measures; why in normal
participants different measures of subjective timing appear
mutually repulsive, and how despite such disunity perception
remains near-veridical on average across measures. To see how
these phenomena emerge, note that in the multiple-clocks
analogy, if one clock is particularly slow then this will bias the
average, relative to which even the correct clocks will seem to
be fast. In the brain, the mean neural delay of each sensory
modality could also be attracted to particularly slow (or fast)
neural events such that even events with relatively normal
timing may be perceived as slightly fast (or slow). In PH, the
integrative mechanisms probed by the McGurk task may have
an unusually delayed auditory input, due to a selective brain
lesion. The central tendency of the distribution will shift to-
wards auditory lags, and relative to this, auditory signals from
other unaffected mechanisms, such as those performing TOJ,
will now be perceived to be leading. Yet on average across
these measures, and despite pathological disruptions of
timing, performance remains near-veridical. Renormalisation
also explains the negative correlation we observed in healthy
individuals, for whom auditory and visual timing may varynaturally in a similar (or opposite) direction to PH: in different
people the greater the deviation in the auditory lead (lag) di-
rection for some mechanisms, the more auditory leading
(lagging) will be reported for othermechanisms, relative to the
mean asynchrony, thus resulting in an apparent antagonism
between mechanisms. Given that the mean neural asyn-
chrony most reliably relates to external synchrony (under
the unity assumption), renormalisation explains how
near-veridical performance is maintained on average, across
mechanisms and also across subjects.
5.5. Simulation
Computations based on statistical distributions are routinely
proposed in Bayesian theories of perception (Miyazaki et al.,
2006; Yamamoto et al., 2012), while functions similar to
averaging over such distributions have been considered in
theories of population coding (Roach et al., 2011). Assuming
similar mechanisms in principle, we performed a simple
simulation, in which we plotted values sampled from two
random variables (‘clocks’), after subtracting each from the
average across a population of clocks. We found that this
simple renormalisation model could accurately simulate the
negative correlation observed (see SupplementaryMethods S2
and Supplementary Figure 2 for further details). This serves to
demonstrate how the observed negative correlation phe-
nomenon might emerge simply as a consequence of
renormalisation, and not due to any explicit antagonism be-
tween mechanisms.
5.6. Conclusions
Neuroscientists and philosophers have long pondered the
relationship between subjective and neural timing (Dennett
and Kinsbourne, 1995; Harris et al., 2008; Spence and Squire,
2003; Zeki and Bartels, 1998). Our observations with PH and
with neurologically healthy participants confirm that
perception is characterised fundamentally by asynchrony and
disunity: different aspects of the same pair of multisensory
stimuli may be perceived with different asynchronies, and
these discrepancies cannot be fully minimised. But an
apparent antagonism between complementary measures of
subjective timing reveals a superordinate principle, by which
discrepant timings in the brain may nevertheless be renor-
malised to their average neural timing. By relating subjective
timing to average neural timing, temporal renormalisation
explains (1) why after a lesion PH experiences auditory leading
in one task but the opposite auditory lead in another, (2) why
different timing measures are negatively correlated across
normal individuals, and (3) how the brain might tell the time
from multiple clocks, with near-veridical accuracy, without
needing resynchronising mechanisms.
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